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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the officer's detention of Ms. Johnson, a 
passenger in a motor vehicle stopped for a faulty brake light, 
violate the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution? 
2. Should this Court review Appellant's claim that the 
detention violated Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
3. Did the officer's detention of Ms. Johnson violate 
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
iv 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden— 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
v 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890175 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26 (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a 
criminal case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final 
judgment and conviction and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) 
(1953 as amended) whereby this Court has discretion to grant a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of 
Appeals. On June 12, 1989, this Court entered its order granting 
Ms. Johnson's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision 
of the Court of Appeals on all issues raised herein. See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant, Karen Johnson, appeals from a conviction and 
judgment for Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as 
amended). The trial judge found her guilty after a bench trial held 
on April 1, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, 
presiding. 
Ms. Johnson timely appealed her conviction to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. On March 21, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued 
its opinion affirming the conviction. That opinion is published at 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989) (Addendum B). 
On April 4, 1989, Ms. Johnson timely filed a Petition for 
Rehearing with the Court of Appeals. Two days later, on April 6, 
1989, that court denied Ms. Johnson's Petition for Rehearing. 
On May 4, 1989, Ms. Johnson timely filed a Petition for 
Writ of Ceriorari with this Court. On June 12, 1989, this Court 
entered its order granting Ms. Johnson's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari (Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 3, 1986, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Deputy 
Stroud of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office stopped a yellow 
1972 Mercury Capri with a broken brake light (T. 5-6). According to 
the officer, he ran a check on the license plates of the vehicle 
prior to the actual stop and obtained the name of the registered 
owner (T. 6). 
After stopping the vehicle, the officer approached and 
asked the driver for identification (T. 6). She produced a driver's 
license but was unable to produce registration which the officer 
requested when he learned that the driver was not the registered 
owner (T. 6). 
The officer then asked the passenger, Karen Johnson, for 
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identification (T. 6-7J.1 She told the officer she did not have 
identification but gave him her name and date of birth. The deputy 
took the driver's license and the information from Ms. Johnson back 
to his vehicle, where he called dispatch and inquired whether each 
individual had a valid driver's license and whether there were any 
outstanding warrants on either woman (T. 7, 15). He told the driver 
and Ms. Johnson that he would be back in a minute and indicated that 
he expected Ms. Johnson to wait while he returned to his car (T. 22). 
The deputy testified that he ran a check on Ms. Johnson 
"[b]ecause there was a possibility that [the] vehicle could have 
been stolen" (T. 7-8). However, he did not ask the driver how she 
came to be in possession of the vehicle or otherwise attempt to 
ascertain whether the vehicle was stolen by questioning the driver 
or Ms. Johnson. Nor did the deputy run a check to determine whether 
the car was stolen (T. 12). 
The officer also testified that it was not unusual to 
stop cars and find that the owner was not driving (T. 17, 18). The 
car was in fact not stolen (T. 16), and the only information which 
made the officer speculate that it might be stolen was the fact that 
the registered owner was not driving and the driver was unable to 
find the registration (T. 7-8). 
The officer acknowledged that ascertaining whether 
Ms. Johnson had a valid driver's license would not help him 
1
 Contrary to the findings of the trial judge, as 
adopted by the Court of Appeals, the officer did not learn that the 
driver's license was suspended until after he detained Appellant 
(T. 6, 7, 15) . 
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determine whether the car was stolen (T. 15) but claimed that if 
Ms. Johnson had outstanding warrants for car theft, he "possibly11 
would think it more likely that the vehicle had been stolen (T. 16). 
The car was in fact not stolen, and Appellant was merely 
riding with her friend to pick up the child of her friend's roommate 
(T. 24) . 
The officer testified that it was his normal procedure to 
obtain the name and date of birth of passengers in a traffic stop 
and that he routinely used this practice to pick up people who might 
have outstanding warrants (T. 20, 21). The officer was unsure how 
much time passed from when he returned to his car until he received 
information from dispatch, but he knew it was at least several 
minutes (T. 19). According to Ms. Johnson, fifteen minutes passed 
between the time the officer asked her for her name and the time he 
returned (T. 28) . 
Several minutes after the officer returned to his 
vehicle, dispatch informed him that the driver had a suspended 
driver's license and that Ms. Johnson had outstanding warrants 
(T. 8) . 
The officer arrested Ms. Johnson and, incident to that 
arrest, searched her bag and found the evidence with which she was 
convicted of the offense in this case (T. 9-11). 
Ms. Johnson's testimony differed from that of Officer 
Stroud in that she recalled that the officer first took the license 
of the driver to his car, then returned in five to ten minutes 
(T. 26). She remembered the length of time because she smoked one 
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or two cigarettes while waiting (T. 26). When he returned, the 
officer asked Ms. Johnson to walk back to his car and give him her 
name and date of birth. The officer wrote the information on a 
clipboard, then told Ms. Johnson to return to and sit in the vehicle 
in which she had been riding (T. 27). 
Prior to trial, Ms. Johnson, by and through counsel, 
filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from her person or 
property on the grounds that all items seized were the fruit of an 
unlawful seizure of her person in violation of the fourth amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution (R. 14-15).2 The trial court held an evidentiary 
hearing on the motion, after which it denied the motion to suppress 
"unless defendant can submit law to the contrary" (R. 17). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The fact that the driver of a vehicle is not the 
registered owner and the driver cannot locate the registration does 
not amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is 
stolen and that a passenger in the vehicle was involved in the 
theft. Having a driver who is not the registered owner is 
consistent with innocent behavior, i.e. that the driver borrowed the 
car. The inability of a nonowner—or even an owner—to find 
registration does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion the 
2
 A typographical error in the motion incorrectly 
labeled the applicable provision in the Utah Constitution as 
Article I, § 13. 
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vehicle is stolen. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the officer had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, he exceeded the 
scope of any permissible detention by failing to diligently pursue 
an investigation as to whether the vehicle was stolen. Running a 
warrants check on Ms. Johnson did not aid the officer in determining 
whether the vehicle was stolen. 
The detention of Ms. Johnson was unreasonable and the 
fruits of that unreasonable seizure should be suppressed. 
Appellant adequately raised the Utah Constitutional issue 
in the trial court and preserved that issue for review by referring 
to the Utah Constitutional provision in her Motion to Suppress and 
memorandum in support thereof and by briefly arguing it during the 
hearing. 
Detaining a passenger in a motor vehicle for a warrants 
check is a seizure under the Utah Constitution. The Utah 
Constitution offers greater protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures than does the federal constitution. The 
seizure was not reasonable under the Utah Constitution, and the 
fruits thereof should be suppressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF APPELLANT VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. While not all 
encounters between police and citizens amount to "seizures" within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment, where such a seizure does 
occur, the requirements of that amendment apply. See State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-8 (Utah 1987). 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly decided that Deputy 
Stroud "seized" Appellant in this case when he "told her to wait 
while he returned to his vehicle to check on the driver's license 
and to run a warrants check on defendant." State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App. 1989). In reaching its decision, the Court 
quoted its opinion in State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 
1987), pointing out that 
A seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment occurs only when the officer by means of 
physical force or show of authority has in some 
way restricted the liberty of a person. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328. As the Court noted further, a seizure 
occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, believes he is not free to leave. Id.; 
see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
The stop of a motor vehicle is a detention of the driver 
and the occupants of the vehicle. See Delaware v. Prouse, 44 0 U.S. 
648 (1979); State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
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When an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, "he may 
briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the 
vehicle registration and the driver's license." Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
at 1135. The further detention of a passenger for the purposes of 
obtaining identification and running a warrants check goes beyond 
the scope of a detention for a traffic violation and requires a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the passenger is involved in 
criminal activity in order to withstand fourth amendment scrutiny. 
See Johnson v. State, 601 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1980) pet. 
cert, denied June 30, 1980; see also Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135.3 
In the present case, the officer testified that after 
obtaining Ms. Johnson's name and date of birth, he went back to his 
vehicle to run a warrants check on both Ms. Johnson and the driver 
as well as a check to determine whether each woman's license was 
valid (T. 7). Several minutes passed while he ran the check 
(T. 19); during that time, Deputy Stroud expected Ms. Johnson to 
wait for him (T. 22), and she sat in the car and waited as expected 
(To 29-30).4 Given the deputy's testimony that Ms. Johnson was not 
free to leave, the determination of the Court of Appeals that Deputy 
3
 In United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 
1973), the Court held that an officer needed a reasonable 
articulable suspicion in order to detain an individual for a 
warrants check after issuing the defendant a citation. Although 
Luckett did not involve a vehicle stop, it supports the proposition 
that detaining a person in order to run a warrants check is a 
seizure. 
4
 Ms. Johnson and Deputy Stroud had slightly different 
versions of what occurred. She testified that he told her to wait 
and that the warrants check took fifteen minutes (T. 26-27). 
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Stroud seized Ms. Johnson was correct. 
In order for a seizure to be upheld under the fourth 
amendment, the officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion 
that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-8 (Utah 1987). A majority of 
the panel in the Court of Appeals which heard this case held that 
Deputy Stroud had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
vehicle was stolen which justified the detention of Ms. Johnson 
under the fourth amendment. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328-9. Judge Orme 
dissented, stating simply: 
The only facts relied on by the officer were that 
the driver's name was not the name of the 
registered owner and the driver was not able to 
locate the registration certificate. These facts 
are just as consistent with the more likely 
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from its 
rightful owner. Absent more—and this is all the 
officer pointed to—there was simply no 
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, that 
the car had been stolen. 
Id. at 36. In reaching its decision, the majority misconstrued the 
facts in this case and misapplied the law. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court carved out a limited exception to the general probable 
cause requirement under the fourth amendment. In order to justify a 
particular detention, an officer must be able to point to specific 
articulable facts which, when viewed under an objective standard, 
create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed or is 
about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 
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Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). This Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals have applied that standard in numerous cases. See, 
e.g., State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); 
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986); State v. Truiillo, 739 
P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
Although the determination as to whether an officer had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the detained person was 
involved in criminal activity is "fact sensitive," examples of cases 
where the appellate court held that the officer lacked such a 
suspicion are illustrative. See Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976. 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1985), at 
3:00 a.m., a police officer seized the individuals in a vehicle with 
Arizona license plates which had been moving slowly through a 
neighborhood where a number of burglaries had recently occurred. 
This Court held that the officer lacked a reasonable articulable 
suspicion "that the occupants of the car were engaged in or about to 
engage in any criminal activity." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976, citing 
Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675. 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976-7 (Utah App. 1987), 
neither Sierra's "nervous behavior" nor his driving in the left lane 
was sufficient to justify a stop. See also State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). In State v. Schlosser, the passenger in 
a vehicle stopped for speeding moved around in the cab of the truck 
while the driver walked back to the officer's car with a driver's 
license and registration. This Court determined that the officer 
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did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the passenger 
was involved in criminal activity. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137. 
The only facts articulated by the officer in an attempt 
to justify the detention of Ms. Johnson were that the driver was not 
the owner of the vehicle and the driver could not find the 
registration (T. 13). The deputy claimed that those two facts led 
him to believe there was a "possibility" that the vehicle was stolen 
(T. 7-8).5 However, his "suspicion" was not strong enough to cause 
him to run a check on the car to see if it was stolen or otherwise 
pursue that "possibility" (T. 12). 
Although the officer based his speculation on the fact 
that the driver was not the registered owner and could not produce 
registration, he testified that such a situation is not unusual 
(T. 17, 18). Common sense suggests that the inability to find 
registration is as consistent with the circumstances of a borrowed 
car as it is with a stolen car. 
5
 The trial court in part based its decision on the fact 
that the driver was unable to produce a valid license (T. 4 6-7). 
The deputy was not aware, however, that the driver's license was 
suspended until after he had detained Ms. Johnson (T. 6, 7, 15). 
Therefore, this fact does not figure into the determination as to 
whether the deputy had a reasonable articulable suspicion. 
The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the trial 
court's statement that: 
where there is a legitimate traffic stop, the 
driver has a suspended license, and there is "no 
way of telling who the owner of the vehicle is and 
whether they have permission to drive it because 
the owner is not present," a reasonable officer 
would inquire regarding the identity of a 
passenger. 
771 P.2d at 329 (emphasis added). 
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In addition, a "possibility" is not equivalent to a 
constitutionally required reasonable articulable suspicion. It is 
more along the lines of a hunch or speculation, neither of which 
support a seizure under the fourth amendment. See State v. 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah App. 1987). 
Furthermore, a "possibility" that a car is stolen does 
not automatically implicate the passenger in any illegal activity. 
See State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-3 (Utah 1986) ("[A] person's 
mere presence in the company of others whom the police have probable 
cause to search does not provide probable cause to search that 
person." Id., citing United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 68 
S.Ct. 222, 225, 92 L.Ed.2d 210 (1948)). See also Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238, reh. den. 444 
U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct. 741, 62 L.Ed.2d 737 (1979) ("a person's mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity 
does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that 
person"). 
Finally, assuming arguendo that the meager facts known to 
the deputy when he made the decision to detain Ms. Johnson in some 
way amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle 
was stolen and that Ms. Johnson was somehow implicated, the officer 
exceeded the scope of any permissible seizure when he detained 
Ms. Johnson to run a warrants check on her. 
In Schlosser, this Court held that opening a passenger's 
door exceeds the scope of a traffic stop. 774 P.2d at 1135. 
Relying on Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 
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1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), this Court noted that the United States 
Supreme Court has held "that even a small intrusion beyond the 
legitimate scope of an initially lawful search is unlawful under the 
Fourth Amendment." Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135. 
In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 684 (1985), the 
Court noted that "an investigative detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop." Citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983), 
the Court noted that "in assessing the effect of the length of the 
detention, we take into account whether the police diligently 
pursued their investigation." Jd. at 709-10. 
In the present case, the officer's actions in running a 
warrant check on Ms. Johnson did not further any investigation into 
whether the vehicle was in fact stolen. The officer acknowledged 
that ascertaining whether Ms. Johnson had a valid driver's license 
would not help him determine whether the car was stolen (T. 15). 
Furthermore, all of his actions and his testimony (T. 20, 21) 
indicated that he did not believe the car was stolen but that he was 
on a "fishing expedition" to see whether he could find some basis 
for arresting either occupant of the vehicle. 
A check on the vehicle or a simple question to the driver 
as to who owned the vehicle and how she came to be in possession of 
it would have resolved any "suspicion" or speculation that the 
vehicle was stolen. Assuming arguendo that the officer had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, he 
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violated Ms. Johnson's fourth amendment rights by failing to 
diligently pursue the investigation and exceeding the scope of the 
detention. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the officer 
detained Ms. Johnson based on a hunch, speculation or "possibility" 
and not a constitutionally required reasonable articulable suspicion. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals leaves officers with 
unbridled discretion to detain and run a warrants check on all 
passengers in vehicles where the owner is not present. Persons who 
look a little different or who officers want to "shake down" will be 
detained while wealthier, more mainstream people riding in borrowed 
cars will not be seized for warrants checks. 
Even though common sense and the police officer in the 
instant case agree that it is not unusual to stop cars and find that 
the owner is not present (T. 17, 18) and even though the absence of 
the registered owner is as consistent with innocent behavior as it 
is with criminal behavior (Johnson, 771 P.2d at 329, Orem, J., 
dissenting), officers will be free to detain all occupants of a 
vehicle who are riding in borrowed cars. Such a result does not 
comport with the freedoms guaranteed by our society or with the 
reasonable expectation of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment, 
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that she was detained 
in violation of the fourth amendment. Appellant further requests 
that her conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
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trial with an order that the fruits of that illegal seizure be 
suppressed (see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). 
POINT II. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED 
UTAH STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
A. APPELLANT PRESERVED THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
The Court of Appeals refused to address the state 
constitutional issue raised by Appellant because "defendant failed 
to brief or argue these issues at the trial level . . . ." State v. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327-8. Contrary to the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, Appellant adequately raised this issue in the trial 
court. 
Appellant filed a written Motion to Suppress in which she 
claimed that the detention in the present case violated her rights 
against illegal search and seizure as articulated in both the 
federal and state constitutions (R. 14 ) . 6 
In her memorandum in support of that Motion to Suppress, 
Appellant referred to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution 
(R. 23). At oral argument on the Motion to Suppress, Appellant 
again claimed that her rights under the Utah Constitution were 
violated. Defense counsel stated: 
. . . . I think it violates the Utah Constitution 
as well, although that has not been developed in 
the case law very well, . . . . 
6
 The Motion to Suppress inadvertently cited Article I, 
§ 13 rather than Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
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(T. 40). 
In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), a majority 
of this Court, comprised of Chief Justice Hall, Justice Howe and 
Judge Orme of the Court of Appeals, pointed out that this Court has 
never drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded by the 
Utah Constitution and the federal constitution in the search and 
seizure context. However, in footnote 8, this Court pointed out 
that: 
In declining to depart in this case from our 
consistent refusal heretofore to interpret 
Article I, Section 14 of our constitution in a 
manner different from the fourth amendment to the 
federal constitution, we have by no means ruled 
out the possibility of doing so in some future 
case. 
Id. at 1221. 
In his dissent in Watts, Justice Zimmerman pointed out 
that he did not agree with the majority's assertions that the Court 
had never drawn any distinctions between the two constitutions. Id. 
at 1225. Justice Durham concurred with Justice Zimmerman's dissent. 
Given the uncertainty reflected in Watts as to whether 
any distinctions between the search and seizure provisions in the 
two constitutions have been drawn in the past or will be drawn in 
the future, defense counsel's statement that the Utah Constitutional 
provision "has not been developed in the case law very well" (T. 40) 
raised the issue for the trial court and reflected the current state 
of the law. 
The decision in Watts also reflects what has become a 
difficult position for criminal defense lawyers. Criminal defense 
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lawyers are, for the most part, aware that this Court is interested 
in a separate analysis of issues under the Utah Constitution. 
However, because very little separate Utah Constitutional case law 
has been developed and because other states rarely offer a case on 
point, defense lawyers often have little substance to argue other 
than that if the federal constitution does not protect the 
defendant, the state constitution does. Given the paucity of state 
constitutional case law, such an argument at the trial level should 
preserve a Utah Constitutional issue for appellate review. 
In addition to the reference to the Utah Constitution in 
the Motion to Suppress, Memorandum in Support of the Motion, and 
oral argument, defense counsel submitted a number of cases to the 
trial court (R. 29-92). At least one of those, State v. Carpena, 
714 P.2d at 675, explicitly refers to Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 
as amended) and thereby raised the statutory argument. Other cases 
submitted by defense counsel do not refer to either the State or 
federal constitution and emphasize the overlap between the two 
arguments and the confusion as to what distinction, if any, exists. 
In reaching its decision that Appellant did not preserve 
this issue for appellate review, the Court of Appeals relied on a 
civil case, James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) for 
the proposition that 
Nominally alluding to such different 
constitutional guarantees without any analysis 
before the court does not sufficiently raise the 
issue to permit consideration by this court on 
appeal. 
Johnson. 771 P.2d at 328. 
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In James, the Court did not address whether nominally 
raising a state constitutional issue preserves it for appeal. 
Instead, the Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether 
appellant James was precluded from raising an equitable mortgage 
theory on appeal which had not been raised in the trial court. The 
rationale in James and the civil cases cited therein is that 
theories which have not been argued or pled in the trial court 
cannot be appropriately raised from either a legal or factual 
standpoint on appeal. The Court noted in James, however, that 
A matter is sufficiently raised if it has been 
submitted to the trial court and the trial court 
has had an opportunity to make findings of fact or 
law [citation omitted]. 
746 P.2d at 801.7 Hence, James does not support the stringent rule 
for appellate review of state constitutional issues in criminal 
cases outlined by the Court of Appeals in the present case. 
The Court of Appeals also relied on State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d 656 (Utah 1985), and State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981), in 
reaching its decision that Appellant did not preserve this issue. 
Neither case precludes appellate review under the circumstances of 
this case. 
In Lee, the defendant had argued at the trial court that 
7
 The Court further noted that the rule against raising 
a legal theory for the first time on appeal is "to be stringently 
applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual 
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial 
[citation omitted]." 746 P.2d at 801. In the present case, all 
factual issues had been presented to the trial court, so stringent 
application of the rule against raising a new legal theory on appeal 
is not necessary. 
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the search was unlawful, thereby making the seizure unlawful, but 
had not argued that the seizure alone was unconstitutional. On 
appeal, the defendant raised the seizure issue for the first time, 
and this Court refused to address it. Lee, 633 P.2d at 52-3. In 
Carter, the defendant argued at the trial court that the frisk of 
his person following his arrest was unlawful. On appeal, he argued 
for the first time that the search of his backpack was unlawful 
because it was out of his possession at the time of the search. 
This Court again refused to address the issue because it was out of 
his possession at the time of the search. This Court again refused 
to address the issue because it had not been raised in the trial 
court. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660-1. 
Unlike Carter or Lee, Appellant did not bring up the Utah 
Constitutional issue for the first time on appeal. Appellants 
argument throughout has been that the detention of her person, where 
she was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a faulty equipment 
violation, was unlawful and that the fruits from that unlawful 
detention should be suppressed. She in fact raised the Utah 
Constitutional issue in the trial court and recognized that a 
separate Utah Constitutional analysis has not yet been developed in 
case law. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals fails to give 
criminal defendants a clear picture of the extent of argument which 
is necessary at the trial court level in order to preserve a state 
constitutional issue for appeal. Where provisions of the state 
constitution have not been analyzed in case law requiring trial 
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counsel to do more than name the applicable provision of the Utah 
Constitution leaves appellate and trial counsel in a "never-never 
land" where it is unclear in almost any case where little analysis 
exists as to what exactly must be done to preserve an issue. The 
next step from Johnson is to refuse to review an issue on appeal 
because in making his argument on appeal, defendant emphasizes a 
case which he did not rely on at the trial court level. Such a 
position would turn the requirement that an issue be preserved at 
trial into an elaborate game for which no one knows the precise 
rules. 
In this case, where Appellant referred to the Utah 
Constitution in her Motion to Suppress and memorandum in support 
thereof, orally argued that the area was not well developed, 
presented case law, and placed the applicable evidence before the 
court, the issue was adequatey raised in the trial court and 
preserved for appellate review. 
B. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED UTAH 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTONAL LAW. 
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
As previously outlined, supra at 16-17, as a result of 
this Court's decision in State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), 
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it is unclear what distinctions, if any, this Court has drawn 
between Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth 
amendment to the federal constitution* However, it is clear from 
the decision in Watts that the possibility of interpreting 
Article I, § 14 differently from the fourth amendment has not been 
"ruled out." Id. at 1221, fn. 8. 
Historically, Utah adopted its constitution at a time 
when the residents of this state may well have had a greater 
interest in privacy than residents of other states. Polygamy had 
recently been outlawed as a prerequisite for statehood, and the 
recent history of animosity between federal agents and state 
residents regarding this issue supports a greater expectation of 
privacy and an interpretation of the Utah Constitution giving 
individuals greater protection under Article I, § 14 than under the 
fourth amendment. 
Case law from other states interpeting their state 
constitutions can also be used to support Appellants argument that 
the detention violated her rights under Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985), the 
Alaska Supreme Court found that it should "construe Alaska7s 
constitutional provisions such as Article I, Section 14 as affording 
additional rights to those granted by the United States Supreme 
Court under the federal constitution." The Court in Jones chose to 
apply a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under Alaska 
law than is required under the federal constitution. The Washington 
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Supreme Court made a similar choice in State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 
13 6 (Wash. 1984). In Jackson, the Court found that the Washington 
Constitution provided greater protections than did the federal 
constitution to the citizens of that state against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by police. Id. at 143. 
In State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1369 (La. 1978), an 
officer stopped a vehicle to issue a citation and ordered the 
passengers out of the car. As one of the passengers was getting 
out, the officer noticed a sawed off shotgun in the car. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that: 
[b]y stopping the automobile the police have 
decided that the driver will be detained. Such is 
not the case for the passenger, who has not broken 
the law and who may walk away from the scene 
unless the police officer has some other 
legitimate reason to detain him. Certainly the 
passenger has a higher expectation of privacy than 
the driver, because the passenger plays no part in 
the routine traffic infraction and has reason to 
suppose that any exchange with the authorities 
will be conducted by the driver alone. 
The Williams Court, without deciding the fourteenth 
amendment issue, held that under the Louisiana Constitution, the 
detention of the passengers was not permissible. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended) also supports 
Appellant's argument that the detention violated the Utah 
Constitution. That statute provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
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The language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 indicates an 
intent on the part of Utah's Legislature to provide the citizens of 
this state with greater protection than is provided by the federal 
constitution as interpreted in United States v. Merritt, 73 6 F.2d 
223 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Pursuant to this statute, a peace officer may stop a 
person and ask for identification only when the officer has a 
"reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity has occurred or is 
about to occur. Hence, while the United States Constitution may 
allow for police citizen encounters absent a reasonable suspicion, 
the Utah Legislature has provided otherwise, requiring a police 
officer to have a reasonable suspicion to stop and question a 
person. Therefore, Utah statutory and constitutional law requires a 
reasonable suspicion to stop and question an individual, even where 
the detention does not amount to a "seizure" under the fourth 
amendment. 
As outlined in Point I, the officer "seized" Ms. Johnson 
when he detained her to run a warrants check (see discussion supra 
at 7-9). The language of the statute shows that in Utah, any 
detention for the purpose of asking an individual's name amounts to 
a seizure. However, even if this Court does not agree that any 
detention where the officer asks a person for identification amounts 
to a seizure pursuant to Utah statutory and constitutional law, the 
detention of Ms. Johnson in this case was a seizure of her person. 
The officer detained Ms. Johnson for anywhere from several to 
fifteen minutes (T. 19, 28). The officer did more than merely 
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obtain information regarding Ms. Johnson's identity. He expected 
her to remain in the car while he ran a warrants check; she was not 
free to leave and therefore was detained. 
The officer in this case had no objective facts upon 
which to base a reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of 
Ms. Johnson. The officer did not know whether the car was stolen, 
nor did he run a check to find out even though he had the 
opportunity to do so (T. 12). Even if the car had been stolen 
(which it was not), there was nothing to connect Ms. Johnson to a 
crime which may have been committed by the driver (see discussion 
supra at 12). The officer had a hunch which later proved to be 
incorrect; a hunch does not amount to a reasonable suspicion. 
The detention by the officer to check for outstanding 
warrants also constitutes a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1953 as amended). Pursuant to the statute, an officer must have 
reasonable suspicion before questioning a person about her name and 
address. Under the facts of the instant case, no such suspicion 
could have attached to Ms. Johnson. 
As officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the 
detention of Ms. Johnson, the evidence that flowed from the unlawful 
seizure should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests that this Court reverse her conviction 
and remand the case for a new trial with an order that the illegally 
seized evidence be suppressed. 
Respectfully submitted this £tf*HL day of ^JU^^KJLA^^ 
1990. 
DEBRA K. LOY /j 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JSSN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— — O O O O O - — -
Regular May Term, 1989 June 12, 1989 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. NOc 890175 
Karen Marie Johnson, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered 
that a petition for Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as 
prayed* 
ADDENDUM B 
326 Utah 771 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and .Respondent, 
v. 
Karen Marie JOHNSON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870222-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah,, 
March lil 19HM 
llpfieann^ Heniecj April.), urn;* 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District, Salt Lake County, Raymond 8, 
Uno, J., of possession of controlled sub-
stance, and she appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) motor 
vehicle passenger was seized within mean-
ing of Fourth Amendment when deputy 
sheriff who had stopped vehicle took pas-
senger's name and birthdate and expected 
her to wait while he ran warrants check, 
but (2) seizure of passenger, who became 
defendant, constituted temporary detention 
supported by reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that passenger had committed crime, 
Affirmed, 
Orme, J., filed dissenting" opinion 
i O i m m a i t a w <3=>1030(2) 
Court of Appeals would not consider 
claim raised for first time on appeal, that 
Utah Constitution and law provide greater 
protection than Fourth Amendment of 
United States Constitution against unrea-
sonable search and seizure. U.S.C A, 
ConstAmend, 4; Const Art 1, § 14; U C 
A.1953, 77-7-15. 
2. Arrest <s>68(4) 
Motor vehicle passenger was seized 
within meaning of Fourth Amendment 
when deputy sheriff who had stopped ve-
hicle took passenger's name and birthdate 
and expected her to wait while he ran war-
rants check; under totality of the circum-
stancesf passenger was reasonably justified 
m belief that she was MOT * 
A ConstAmend 4 
,i Automobiles &*'£•&{ i; * s 
Fourth Amendment seizure of motor 
vehicle passenger constituted temporary 
detention supported by reasonable articula-
ble suspicion that passenger had committed 
crime; trial judge believed deputy sheriffs 
testimony that deputy believed there was 
possibility vehicle he had stopped for hav-
ing faulty brake light was stolen as driver 
was not registered owner and was unable 
to find vehicle registration, it was reason-
able to ask passenger her name to deter-
mine if her names corresponded with own-
er's name that had been learned prior to 
stopping of vehicle, and passenger was not 
detained for unreasonable period of time. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt (argued), 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant, 
R Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R. 
Larsen (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., for 
plaintiff and respondent 
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and 
OPLN 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, ap-
peals the trial court's denial of her motion 
to suppress and her conviction for posses-
sion of a controlled substance.1 We affirm. 
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff 
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a 
faulty brake light Defendant was a pas-
senger in that vehicle. At the suppression 
hearing, Stroud testified that prior to 
stopping the vehicle, he ran a check on the 
license plate and obtained the name of the 
registered owner. He then approached the 
stopped vehicle and asked the driver for 
her license. The name on the license was 
not the name of the registered owner. 
lc At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on 
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing 
on, defendant's motion to suppress. 
STATE v. JOHNSON 
Cite as 771 P-2d 326 (Utah App, 1989) 
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When Stroud requested the registration 
certificate, the driver was unable to pro-
duce it Stroud then asked defendant for 
identification, reasoning that there was a 
possibility the car was stolen because there 
was no registration and no owner present 
After initially denying that she had any 
identification, defendant told Stroud her 
name and birthdate. 
Stating that he would be right back and 
expecting the driver and defendant to re-
main, Stroud returned to his vehicle and 
ran license checks on the two, determining 
that the driver was driving on a suspended 
license and that defendant had several out-
standing warrants. He did not, however, 
inquire as to whether the car was stolen, 
nor did he know of any reports of stolen 
cars matching that car's description. He 
then wrote a citation on the driver and 
requested a backup police officer. 
When defendant was informed that she 
was being arrested for outstanding war-
rants, she exited the vehicle, holding a 
backpack which had the name "Karen" on 
it Defendant initially denied that the 
backpack belonged to her, but later admit-
ted that it was hers. Incident to her ar-
rest, the bag was searched and was found 
to contain amphetamines, drug parapherna-
lia and defendant's Utah identification. 
Defendant's version of the sequence of 
events varies from Stroud's. She testified 
that after Stroud received the driver's li-
cense, he asked defendant if she had any 
identification. She said that she did not 
He told them to wait, that he would be 
right back, and returned to his vehicle for 
five or ten minutes, long enough for her to 
smoke a cigarette or two. When he re-
turned, he asked for the registration certif-
icate. When it could not be produced, 
Stroud asked defendant to return to his 
vehicle with him, where, at his request, she 
gave him her name and birthdate. He then 
sent her back to the other car. Fifteen 
minutes later, he came back to their car, 
gave the driver a citation, took defendant 
out of the car, frisked and handcuffed her, 
2. Utah has never drawn any distinctions be-
tween these two provisions and has "always 
considered the protections afforded to be one 
and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 
and put her in the front seat of the sher-
iffs car. She had possession of her bag at 
this time. Defendant stated that she gave 
Stroud her name and birthdate because she 
was required to do so, and did not believe 
that she could leave. 
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether 
defendant may raise, for the first time on 
appeal, the argument that state law and 
article 1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
provide greater protection than the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion against unreasonable search and sei-
zure; (2) whether defendant, a passenger 
in a motor vehicle, was seized within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment; and (3) 
if there was a seizure, whether it was 
reasonable. 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, 
we will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). The trial judge is in the best posi-
tion to assess the credibility and accuracy 
of the witnesses' divergent testimonies. 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-156, 
(Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 974 (Utah CtApp.1988). How-
ever, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a "cor-
rection of error" standard. Oates v. Cha-
vez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988). 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
[1] Defendant claims that her detention 
violated the fourth amendment of the Unit-
ed States Constitution and article 1, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. She also ar-
gues that the legislative intent behind Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1980) was to provide 
greater protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures than is provided by 
the fourth amendment, and that her sei-
zure violated the provisions of both consti-
tutions.2 However, defendant failed to 
1221 (Utah 1988). However, in a footnote com-
ment, the court indicated that it has not ruled 
out the possibility of making such a distinction 
in a future case. Id. at n. 8. 
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brief or argue these issues at the trial level 
and first raised her statutory argument in 
her appellate brief. Nominally alluding to 
such different constitutional guarantees 
without any analysis before the trial court 
does not sufficiently raise the issue to per-
mit consideration by this court on appeal 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). "[W]here a defendant fails 
to assert a particular ground for suppress-
ing unlawfully obtained evidence in the tri-
al court, an appellate court will not consid-
er that ground on appeal... . [M]otions to 
suppress should be supported by precise 
averments, not conclusory allegations...." 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 
1985). Also, in State v, Leet 633 P.2d 48, 
53 (Utah 1981), the supreme court stated: 
There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the point now urged upon this Court 
was unavailable or unknown to defen-
dant at the time he filed his motion to 
suppress, and to entertain the point now 
would be to sanction the practice of with-
holding positions that should properly be 
presented to the trial court, but which 
may be withheld for the purpose of seek-
ing a reversal on appeal and a new trial 
or dismissal 
We, therefore, decline to consider" this ar-
gument on appeal 
SEIZURE 
[2] Defendant avers 'that she was 
seized within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment because she felt that she was 
not free to leave when Stroud told her to 
wait while he returned to his vehicle to 
check on the driver's license and to run a 
warrants check on defendant. "A seizure 
within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment occurs only when the officer by 
means of physical force or show of authori-
ty has in some way restricted the liberty of 
a person/' State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 
87 (Utah CtApp.1987). Further, "[w]hen a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, remains, not in the spir-
it of cooperation ,« but because he be-
lieves he is not free to leave/* a seizure 
occurs* Id.; see also United States v. 
Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct 
1870, 1877, 64 LEd.2d 497 (1980). Defen-
dant was, therefore, seized when Stroud 
took her name and birthdate and expected 
her to wait while he ran a warrants check. 
Under the totality of the circumstances 
defendant was reasonably justified in her 
belief that she was not free to go. 
[3] Now; the concern is whether the 
seizure was reasonable and permissible Hin-
der the fourth amendment In State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the reasoning in United States v. Merritt, 
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), wherein 
the Fifth Circuit specified three constitu-
tionally permissible levels of police stops; 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, 'the 
"detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer' 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18. 
We conclude that the present case in-
volves a "level two" stop. Thus, to justify 
the seizure, Stroud had to have a reason-
able "articulable suspicion" that defendant 
had committed a crime. To determine if he 
acted reasonably under the circumstances, 
"due weight must be given, not to his in-
choate and unparticularized suspicion or 
'hunch/ but to the specific reasonable in-
ferences which he is entitled to draw from 
the facts in light of his experience." Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1883, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
At this point, we defer to the findings of 
the trial judge because of his preferred 
position in evaluating the witnesses' credi-
bility. See Arroyo, at 154-156. The 
record indicates that the trial court be-
lieved Stroud's testimony in concluding 
there was an articulable suspicion that de-
fendant had committed a crime. Prior to 
asking defendant for identification, Stroud 
STATE v. JOHNSON 
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believed that there was a possibility the car period of time 
was stolen because the owner was absent 
and there was no registration. He knew 
that the driver was not the owner, but 
determined that it was reasonable to ask 
defendant her name to determine if it cor-
responded with the owner's name he had 
learned prior to stopping the vehicle. The 
fact that Stroud initially chose to do a 
warrants check instead of a stolen vehicle 
check is of no great significance because 
not all stolen cars are reported immediate-
ly. The trial judge stated that where there 
is a legitimate traffic stop, the driver has a 
suspended license, and there is "no way of 
telling who the owner of the vehicle is and 
whether they have permission to drive it 
because the owner is not present," a rea-
sonable officer would inquire regarding the 
identity of a passenger. In weighing the 
testimony, the court was justified in find-
ing that the amount of time defendant was 
required to wait, even though a passenger, 
was reasonable and did not take any longer 
than a normal traffic stop. 
Thus, there was substantial evidence for 
the trial court to find as it did. Although a 
seizure occurred, it conformed to constitu-
tional requirements in that Officer Stroud 
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the car could have been stolen, and defen-
dant was not detained for an unreasonable 
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We, therefore, affirm de-
fendant's conviction. 
DAVIDSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
Although the legal analysis applicable to 
this case is ably set out in the majority's 
opinion, I cannot agree with their ultimate 
conclusion that the arresting officer had an 
articulable suspicion that the automobile 
had been stolen, much less that defendant 
had in any way participated in the theft 
The only facts relied on by the officer 
were that the driver's name was not the 
name of the registered owner and the driv-
er was not able to locate the registration 
certificate. These facts are just as consist-
ent with the more likely scenario that the 
driver borrowed the car from its rightful 
owner. Absent more—and this is all the 
officer pointed to—there was simply no 
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, 
that the car had been stolen. 
I would accordingly reverse. 
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